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Abstract—1We consider an example of stochastic games with
partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain
relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows
managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have
access only to partial information updates, and our approach
is to consider optimal open loop control until the information
update. The agents continuously control the rates of their Poisson
search clocks to acquire the locks, the agent to get all the locks
before others would get reward one. However, the agents have no
information about the acquisition status of others and will incur
a cost proportional to their rate process. We solved the problem
for the case with two agents and two locks and conjectured the
results for N -agents. We showed that a pair of (partial) state-
dependent time-threshold policies form a Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider non-classical and asymmetric information (as
specified in [1]) based games inspired by the full information
games considered in [2]. In [2], agents attempt to acquire
M available destinations; each agent controls its rate of
advertisement through a Social network to increase its chances
of winning the destinations, while trading off the cost for ac-
quisition. They considered full information and no-information
games, and considered discrete time policies by uniformization
of the controlled Markov process. In full information games,
the agents at any point of time know the number of available
destinations or equivalently the number of destinations already
acquired by one or the other agent. In no-information games,
the agents have no information; they don’t even know the
number of destinations acquired by themselves.
It is more realistic to assume that the agents know the
number of destinations acquired by themselves, but would not
know the number acquired by others. This leads to partial,
asymmetric and non-classical information games, which are
the main focus of this paper. Basar et. al in [1] describe a
game to be of non-classical information type, and we describe
1The work is partially sponsored by MALENA, the joint research team
between IIT Bombay and Inria.
the same in our words: if the state of agent i depends upon
the actions of agent j, and if agent j knows some information
which is not available to agent i we have a non-classical
information game. These kind of games are typically hard to
solve ([1]); when one attempts to find best response against a
strategy profile of others, one would require belief of others
states, belief about the belief of others, and so on.
Our approach to this problem can be summarized as “open
loop control till information update”. With no-information, one
has to resort to open loop policies. This is the best when one
has no access to information updates. With full information
one can have closed loop policies, where the optimal action
depends upon the state of the system at the decision epoch.
In full information controlled Markov jump processes, every
agent is informed immediately of the jump in the state and can
change its action based on the change. In our case we have
access to partial information, the agents can observe only some
jumps and not all; thus we need policies that are open loop
type till an information update. At every information update,
one can choose a new open loop control depending upon the
new information.
We considered one and two lock acquisition problems, any
agent wins reward one if it acquires all the locks and if it is the
first one to acquire the locks. The agents have no access to the
information/state of the others, however upon contacting a lock
they would know if they are the first to contact. We obtained
Nash equilibrium for these partial, asymmetric information
games; a pair of (partial) state-dependent time threshold
policies form Nash equilibrium. We obtained these results
(basically best responses) by solving Dynamic programming
equations applicable to (partial) information update epochs
and each stage of the Dynamic programming equations are
solved by solving appropriate optimal control problems and
the corresponding Hamiltonian Jacobi equations.
A block chain network is a distributed ledger that is
completely open to all nodes; each node will have a copy
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2of transactions (in case of currency exchange). If a new
transaction is to be added (linked) to the previously existing
chain in the form of a new block, it requires the miners
(designated special nodes) to search for a key (encryption),
that enables it to be added to the ledger. This search of the
key requires computational power and time. The first miner to
get the right key, gets a financial reward. If the miners would
not know the status of the search efforts of others, the resulting
game is exactly as in our one lock problem. Two lock problem
can be viewed as the extension of one lock problem, wherein
a second key is required to gain the reward.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Two agents are competing to win a project. There are two
or one lock(s) to win the project, and the aim of the agents is
to reach these as quickly as possible. The agent that contacts
all the locks before the other gets a reward equal to one unit.
Further they need to contact the lock(s) before the deadline T .
The contact process is controllable; the agents control
the rate of the contact process continuously over time and
they would incur some cost for acceleration. The acquisi-
tion/contact process is modelled by a Poisson process. The
rate of contact process can be time varying over the interval
[0, T ], it can further depend upon the number of locks acquired
etc. The higher the rate, the higher the chances of success, but
also higher is the cost of acquisition.
Information structure: The agents have partial/asymmetric
information about the locks acquired by various agents and
would use available information to design their acceleration
strategies optimally. The agents would know at all the times
information (contacted/not contacted etc., at a given time)
related to its contact attempts, however it has limited access to
that of the others. When any agent contacts a lock, it would
know if it is successful; we call a contact successful if the
agent is the first one to contact that particular lock. If the other
agent had contacted the same lock before the tagged customer,
the tagged customer would have an unsuccessful contact. The
agent gets an update of this information immediately after a
contact, and this will also reveal some information about the
status of the other agents. For example, upon a contact, if it
gets aware of a successful contact, it also gets to know that
this is the first one to contact.
Decision epochs: Every agent has a continuous (at all
time instances) update of the status of its contact process,
however there is a major update in its information only at
(lock) contact instances. At these epochs it would know if the
contact is successful/unsuccessful which in turn would reveal
some information about the state of the other agents. Hence
these form the natural decision epochs; an agent can choose
a different action at such time points. Further, it is clear that
the decision epochs of different agents are not synchronous.
Actions: The agents should choose an appropriate rate
(function) for the contact/acceleration process. The rate of
contact, for agent i, at any time point can be between [0, βi].
The agents choose an action which specifies the acceleration
process at the beginning, and change their action every time
it contacts a lock (successfully or unsuccessfully). The action
at any decision epoch is a measurable acceleration process
(that can potentially span over time interval [0, T ]). To be
precise agent i at decision epoch k (the instance at which
it contacted the (k− 1)-customer) chooses an aik ∈ L∞[0, T ],
as the acceleration process to be used till the next acquisition.
Here L∞[0, T ] is the space of all measurable functions that
are essentially bounded, i.e., the space of functions with finite
essential supremum norm:
||a||∞ := inf{β : |a(t)| ≤ β for allmost all t ∈ [0, T ]}.
State: We will have two decision epochs with two lock
problem, and one decision epoch with one lock problem, and
have corresponding number of major state updates. Let zik
represent the information available to agent i immediately
after (k−1)-th contact2. Here zik has two components: a) first
component is a flag indicating that the contact was successful;
b) second component is the time of contact. The first decision
epoch (the only decision epoch with one lock problem) is at
time 0, and the state z1 is simply set to (0, 0) to indicate
0 contacts and ’0’ contact time (which is of no importance
since there is no contact yet). The state at the second decision
epoch z2 = (f, τ), where flag f = s implies successful contact
and f = u implies unsuccessful contact while τ represents the
time of first contact. Let τ ik represent the (random) k-th contact
instance of agent i. Here we view τ ik as a fictitious random
contact instance which can take any value from [0,∞) and
with τ ik > T−τ ik−1 indicating that the agent could not contact
the k-th lock before deadline.
We distinguish the one lock problem from the two lock
problem by using M to represent the number of locks.
Strategy: The strategy of player i
pii =
{
aik(zk); for all possible zk
}
k≤M ,
where a1(·) represents the acceleration process used at start,
2By convention, the start of the process commences with 0-th contact.
3a2(·) represents the acceleration process used after contacting
one lock and this choice depends upon the available informa-
tion z2. To keep notations simple, most of the times and unless
clarity is required, state zk is not used while representing the
actions. One can easily extend this theory to a more general
problem with M locks, but the emphasis of this paper would
be on the case with M = 2. We briefly discuss the extension
to a larger M towards the end of the paper.
Rewards/Costs: The reward of any agent is one, only if it
succeeds to contact all M locks, and further, if it is the first one
to contact the first lock. Let di1 = T ∧ τ i1 (∧ implies minimum
of the two) and di2 = ((T ∧ τ i2)− τ i1)+ respectively represent
the durations3 of the first and the second contact process. The
cost spent on acceleration for the k-th contact equals,
a¯ik(d
i
k), with a¯
i
k(s) :=
∫ s
0
aik(t)dt. (1)
The paper mainly considers two agent problem. The N
agent problem is discussed in section V and the results are
conjectured using the two agent results. Thus for simpler
notations, we represent the tagged customer by i while the
other customer is indexed by j.
The expected utility for stage k equals:
rik(zk, ak;pi
j) (2)
=
{
P iM1k=M − νE
[
a¯ik(d
i
k)
]
if τ ik−1 < T
0 else,
where P iM represents the probability of eventual success (when
all the M locks are contacted before T and when the first
contact is successful) and ν > 0 is the trade-off factor between
the reward and the cost. Note here that the reward (probability
of success) is added only to the last stage, i.e., only when
k = M .
For one lock problem, i.e., when M = 1, the probability of
success equals
P i1 =
∫ T
0
P jf (s
∣∣pij)f iτ,1(s)ds, (3)
where P jf (s
∣∣pij) is the probability that the other agent has not
contacted the lock before the agent i, i.e., before time τ i1 ≈ s
and (see equation (1) for definition of a¯ik(·))
f iτ,1(s) := exp
(−a¯i1(s)) ai1(s) (4)
3As already mentioned, the contact clocks {τ ik} are free running Poisson
clocks, however we would be interested only in those contacts that occurred
before deadline T .
is the density4 of the associated contact process. Recall the
contact process for k-th contact5, is a Poisson process with
time varying rate given by aik. Note simply that the probability
of agent j not contacting the first lock before agent i, for
the given strategy pairs, equals (more details in the proof of
Theorem 1)
P jf (s
∣∣pij) = P (τ j1 > s|τ i1 ≈ s) = exp(−a¯j1(s)) .
In a similar way for the two lock problem,
P i2 =
∫ T
0
P jf (s
∣∣pij)(∫ T
s
f iτ,2(u)du
)
f iτ,1(s)ds, (5)
where P jf (s
∣∣pij) is the probability that the other agent (agent
j) has not contacted the first lock before agent i (which is the
same as the one discussed in the one lock problem) and
f iτ,2(τ
i
1 + s) := exp
(−a¯i2(s)) ai2(s) (6)
is the density of the second-lock contact process of agent i.
It is easy to observe that for any given a ∈ L∞, the expected
cost equals (see (1) and with τ i0 := 0):
E[a¯ik(d
i
k)] = E
[∫ dik
0
aik(s)ds
]
= a¯ik(T − τ ik−1) exp(−a¯ik(T − τ ik−1))
+
∫ T−τik−1
0
a¯ik(s) exp
(
−a¯ik(s)
)
aik(s)ds. (7)
If the contact occurs after the deadline T , one has to pay for
the entire duration T − τ ik−1 (with zero reward) and hence the
first term in the above equation.
Game Formulation: The overall utility of agent i, when
player j chooses the strategy pij is given by
J i(pii, pij) =
M∑
k=1
E[rik(zk, ak; pij)]. (8)
Thus we have a strategic/normal form non-cooperative game
problem and our aim is to find a pair of policies (that depend
only upon the available (partial) information) that form the
Nash equilibrium (NE).
We begin with a one lock problem in the next section.
4It is clear that the complementary CDF of τ i1 (time till agent i contacts
the destination, immaterial of whether it is the first one or not and whether
it is before T or not), under deterministic policy pii, is not influenced by the
strategies of others and is given by:
P (τ i1 > t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
ai1(s)ds
)
and thus its PDF is given by
f iτ,1(t) = exp
(−a¯i1(t)) ai1(t) with a¯i1(s) := ∫ t
0
ai1(s)ds.
5We would like to emphasise here that k represents the number of the
contacts.
4III. ONE LOCK PROBLEM
We specialize to one lock problem in this section, while the
two lock problem is considered in the next section. Here the
agent that first gets the lock, gets the reward. At any time,
the agents are aware of their own state, but they would know
the information of the others only when it contacts the lock.
At that time, the contact can be successful or unsuccessful,
with the former event implying the other agent has not yet
contacted the lock. In this case the agents have to choose one
contact rate function ai(·)/aj(·) at the start, and would stop
either after a contact or after the deadline T expires. There
is no major information update at any time point before the
(only one) contact and hence this control process is sufficient.
We prove that a pair of (time) threshold policies form an NE
for this game. We prove this by showing that the best response
against a threshold policy is again threshold. Towards this, we
first discuss the best response against any given strategy of
the opponent. Given a policy pij = aj with aj ∈ L∞[0, T ]
of agent j, it is clear that the failure probability of the other
agent j in equation (3) equals:
P jf (s
∣∣pij) = exp(−a¯j(s)),
where a¯j(·) is as defined in (1). The best response for this
case is obtained by (see equations (1)-(7)):
vi1(z1;pij) = sup
ai∈L∞
J(ai; aj) with
J(ai; aj) =
∫ T
0
(
exp(−a¯j1(s))− νa¯i(s)
)
exp(−a¯i(s))ai(s)ds
−νa¯i(T ) exp(−a¯i(T )). (9)
For any given policy pij = aj(·) of the other agent, the above
best response is clearly a finite horizon (T ) optimal control
problem as J can be rewritten as
J(ai) =
∫ T
0
(
hj(s)− νx(s)) exp(−x(s))ai(s)ds (10)
+g(x(T )),
with state process
·
x (t) = ai(t) and thus x(t) =
∫ t
0
ai(t)dt = a¯i(s),
a given function
hj(s) := exp(−a¯j(s)),
and with terminal cost
g(x) = −νx exp(−x). (11)
Here we need to note that x(t) represents the state process
for the optimal control problem that is used as a tool to solve
the original best response problem and is not the state process
of the actual/original problem. Further in two lock problem
(considered in the next section), we will have one such optimal
control problem for each stage and for each state and each
of those optimal control problems will have their own state
processes.
Conjecture: We aim to prove using Hamilton Jacobi (HJB)
equations (which provide solution to the above mentioned
optimal control problems of each stage), that the best response
against any policy of agent j would be a time-threshold type
policy as discussed below. We are yet to prove this. However
from the nature of the HJB equations one can conclude that
the best response policies are of bang-bang type. Currently we
continue with deriving the best response against time-threshold
policies.
A. Best response against silent opponent
We begin with best response of an agent, when the other
agent is silent, i.e., when aj(t) = 0 for all t. This particular
result will be used repeatedly (also for the case with two locks)
and hence is stated first. Let C := {a ∈ L∞ : ||a|| ≤ βi}.
Theorem 1. [Best response, against silent opponent] When
an agent attempts to acquire a lock for any given time U , and
when there is no competition and if it receives a reward c
upon success: i) the best response of (9) is derived by solving
the following optimal control problem:
v(x) := sup
a(·)∈C
{∫ U
0
(
c− νx(s)) exp(−x(s))a(s)ds
−νx(U) exp(−x(U))
}
with
·
x (t) = a(t) and x(0) = x.
ii) The solution of the above problem is the following:
a∗(t) =
{
βi for all t if ν ≤ c
0 for all t if ν > c
and
v(x) =
{[
(c− ν) (1− exp(−βiU))− νx] exp(−x) if ν ≤ c
−νx exp(−x) if ν > c.
(12)
Proof: We drop the superscript i in this proof, for simpler
notations. Using density (4), the expected reward (against
5silent opponent) equals
E[R] = cE[τ1 < U ] = c
∫ U
0
exp(−a¯(t))a(t)dt
= c
∫ U
0
exp(−x(t))a(t)dt. (13)
The cost does not depend upon the existence of other players,
hence remains the same as in (7), reproducing here for clarity:
E[a¯(d1)] = exp(−x(U))x(U) +
∫ U
0
x(t) exp (−x(t)) a(t)dt
Then the overall problem is to maximize E[R] − νE[a¯(d1)]
and hence we consider
sup
a(.)
{∫ U
0
L(t, x(t), a(t))dt+ g(x(U))
}
with
L(t, x, a) = (c− νx) exp (−x)a and g(x) = −νx exp(−x).
Thus we need the solution of the following (Hamiltonian
Jacobi) HJB PDE, with v(t, x) representing the value function
and with vt, vx its partial derivatives
vt(t, x) + max
a∈[0,β]
{L(t, x, a) + avx(t, x)} = 0
or in other words
vt(t, x) + max
a∈[0,β]
{(c− νx) exp (−x)a+ avx(t, x)} = 0
with boundary condition v(U, x) = g(x) = −νx exp(−x).
Claim: We claim the following is a solution6 satisfying the
above boundary valued problem (when ν < c):
W (t, x) = (−νx− ν + c) exp(−x) + κ exp(−x+ βt) with
κ = exp(−βU)(ν − c).
Note that its partial derivatives are:
Wx(t, x) = (νx− c) exp(−x)− κ exp(−x+ βt),
Wt(t, x) = βκ exp(−x+ βt), and clearly for any a,
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x) = −κ exp(−x+ βt)a.
Thus if κ ≤ 0, the maximizer in HJB PDE is βi and then
W (., .) satisfies the HJB PDE,
Wt(t, x) + κ exp(−x+ βt)β = 0,
and also satisfies the boundary condition
W (T, x) = (−νx− ν + c) exp(−x)
+ exp(−βU)(ν − c) exp(−x+ βU)
= −νx exp(−x) for any x.
6We derived the above solution by solving the HJB PDE after replacing
the maximizer with β.
It is further easy to verify that a∗(t) = βi for all t and
x∗(t) = βit satisfy equation (5.7) of [3, Theorem 5.1]. Thus
when κ ≤ 0 or equivalently when ν ≤ c then the optimal
policy is to attempt with highest possible rate all the times.
When ν > c, using similar logic one can show that
W (t, x) = −νx exp(−x) (for all x, t) is the solution of the
HJB PDE and a∗(t) = 0 for all t. 
Using similar techniques one can find best response against
any given time-threshold policy, which is next considered.
B. Best response against a time Threshold policy
Assume now player j uses the following time-threshold
policy, represented by:
Γ(ψj) : aj(t) = βjX[0,ψj ](t), with ψj ≤ T.
Basically agent j attempts with maximum acceleration βj till
time ψj and stops completely after that. In this case the failure
probability of agent j in equation (3) simplifies to:
P jf (s
∣∣pij) = exp(−βj(s ∧ ψj)), when pij = Γ(ψj),
and so
hj(s) =
{
exp(−βjs) if s ≤ ψj
exp(−βjψj) if s > ψj . (14)
The best response against such a Threshold policy of agent j
is obtained in the following. From Theorem 1, it is clear that
the best responses against any strategy would be to remain
silent when ν ≥ 1 and when the reward equals one. Thus the
Nash equilibrium strategies would be to remain silent by both
the agents for ν ≥ 1. From now on, we consider ν < 1.
Theorem 2. [Best response] Assume ν < 1. The best response
of agent i against Γ (ψ) policy of agent j is given by:
BRi(Γ(ψ)) =
Γ(T ) if ν < exp (−βjψ)Γ(θiν) else.
where, θiν = min
{
− ln(ν)
βj
, T
}
.
Proof: The details of this proof are in Appendix A. 
Thus when agent j uses threshold strategy with small ψ, best
response of agent i is to attempt till the end and if the threshold
of agent j is larger, ψ ≥ θiν then the best response of agent i
is to try till θiν (irrespective of the actual value of ψ).
C. Nash Equilibrium
We observe from the above result that the best response
against a threshold policy is again a threshold policy. Thus one
can get the Nash equilibrium if one can find two thresholds
one for each agent, such that
Γ(ψi) ∈ BRi(Γ(ψj)) and Γ(ψj) ∈ BRj(Γ(ψi)).
6From Theorem 2, it is easy to find such a pair of thresholds
and is also easy to verify that this pair of thresholds is unique.
We have the following:
Theorem 3. [Nash Equilibrium] Assume ν < 1, and without
loss of generality βj ≥ βi. For a two agent partial information
game, we have a Nash equilibrium among (time) threshold
policies, as defined below:(
Γ(θiν), Γ(θ
j
ν)
)
if βj = βi(
Γ(θiν), Γ(T )
)
if βj > βi
where threshold θiν is as in Theorem 2, while θ
j
ν is given by:
θjν = min
{
− ln(ν)
βi
, T
}
. 
Proof: The first line is easily evident from Theorem 2. For
the second one, observe the following: when ψi = θiν :
exp(−βiθiν) = exp(βi ln(ν)/βj) ≥ ν,
because βi ln(ν)/βj ≥ ln(ν) (note ln(ν) < 0) and thus
BRj(θ
i
ν) = Γ(T ).
Now if exp(−βjT ) ≤ ν, then clearly BRi(T ) = Γ(θiν). On
the other hand if exp(−βjT ) > ν, then θiν = T . 
It is further clear that (simple calculations using Theorem
2) we have unique Nash Equilibrium among time threshold
policies. It would be more interesting if we can show this is
the unique NE, but that would be a part of future work.
Thus when one has no access to the information of the other
agent till their own contact with the lock, the NE are given by
open loop policies. But this is true only for one lock (M = 1)
problem. With large M , we will have closed loop policies but
the policies change only at major information change epochs.
In all, we will see that the NE will again have a group of open
loop policies, each of which is used till a major change in the
information.
IV. TWO LOCK PROBLEM
Before we proceed with the analysis we would summarize
the protocol again. Any agent succeeds only if it contacts lock
one, followed by lock two and only the agent that gets both
the locks receives reward one. If a particular agent contacts
the lock one, we say it had an unsuccessful contact if it is
not the first one to contact the lock. If an agent’s contact is
unsuccessful, there is no incentive for the agent to try any
further. On the other hand when an agent is successful, it
knows it would be the only one to chase the second lock.
We can use the previous (M = 1 case) analysis, Theorem
1, to compute the best response against silence opponent (for
second lock).
This is a two stage problem, as the utility of agent i is given
by:
J i(pii, pij) =
2∑
k=1
E[rik(zk, ak; pij)].
For this two lock case, the best response of agent i against
any given strategy of player j can be solved using (two stage)
dynamic programming (DP) equations as below
vik(zk;pij) = 0 if k = 3 or if τ
i
k−1 > T , and else, (15)
vik(zk;pij) = sup
ak
{
rik(zk, ak;pij) + E[v
i
k+1(zk+1;pij))|zk, ak]
}
,
with stage wise costs as defined in equations (2)-(7). Note
these DPs hold even when the action spaces are Banach spaces,
as in our case.
Like in one-lock case, we obtain a NE, by finding best
response against appropriate threshold strategies.
Threshold strategy for two-lock problem: Our conjecture
is that the strategy constructed using state dependent time-
threshold policies will form a part of the NE. At contact
instance of the first lock, the contact could be successful or
unsuccessful. Thus we have two types of states immediately
after the first contact, i.e., the state after the first contact
is either given by z2 = (s, τ) or by z2 = (u, τ). We
compactly represent Threshold policy by Γ2(ψ) which means
the following:
at start, use Γ(ψ) policy,
if z2 = (s, τ), i.e., when successful use Γ(T − τ) and
if z2 = (u, τ), i.e., when unsuccessful use Γ(0) policy.
Theorem 1, inspires us to conjecture that this kind of a
threshold strategy becomes a part of the NE and the same
is proved in Theorem 4. We begin with the best response.
A. Best response against a Threshold strategy
Say agent j uses threshold strategy Γ2(ψj). We obtain the
best response by solving the DP equations (15) using backward
induction. When k = 2 in (15) and if z2 = (u, τ) it is
immediately clear that (see (2))
v2(z2; Γ2) = 0 for any τ,
as failure with first lock implies zero reward. If z2 = (s, τ),
i.e., if the player i is successful with first lock and the contact
was at τ , the agent j will either have unsuccessful contact
or may not even contact the first lock before the deadline T .
7Further because agent j uses Γ2(ψ) policy it would not try for
the second lock. Thus agent i will attempt for second lock,
while the other agent is silent with respect to second lock.
Thus the optimization problem corresponding to this stage
from equations (2)-(7) is given by:
sup
a(·)∈C
{∫ U
0
(
1− νx(s)) exp(−x(s))a(s)ds
−νx(U) exp(−x(U))
}
with
·
x (t) = a(t) and x(0) = x, with U = T − τ.
This is exactly the optimization problem considered in The-
orem 1 with U = T − τ and hence the best response (with
ν < 1) is given by: Γ(T − τ) (attempt with maximum for the
rest of the period). Thus from Theorem 1 with U = T − τ
and x = 0 we have:
v2(s, τ ; Γ2) = v(0) = (1− ν)
(
1− exp(−βi(T − τ))) and
v2(u, τ ; Γ2) = 0.
Now solving the DP equations for k = 1, it is easy to verify
that the corresponding optimization problem is (with x(·) as
before and see (2), (15)):
sup
a(·)
{
− ν
∫ T
0
x(τ) exp(−x(τ))a(τ)dτ − νx(T ) exp(−x(T ))
+
∫ T
0
exp(−a¯j(τ))v2(s, τ ; Γ2) exp(−x(τ))a(τ)dτ
}
.
This optimization problem is once again solved using optimal
control theory based tools and we directly obtain the following.
When ν ≥ 1/2 it is easy to verify that, both agents being silent
is the Nash equilibrium. This result can easily be derived (by
finding the best responses as in Theorem 5 of Appendix B,
which provides the best response against the silent opponent).
Theorem 4. [Nash Equilibrium] Let ν < 1/2 and assume
βj ≥ βi. The NE is given by the following, under the
conditions:(
Γ2(0),Γ2(0)
)
, if exp(−βjT ) > 1−2ν
1−ν ,(
Γ2(0),Γ2(ψ
j∗
0 )
)
, with ψj∗0 = T +
1
βj
ln
(
1−2ν
1−ν
)
if exp(−βiT ) > 1−2ν
1−ν > exp(−βjT ).
The above ψj∗0 > 0. Now consider that exp(−βiT ) ≤ 1−2ν1−ν .
Let ψi∗ satisfy
exp(−βjψi∗) = min
{
1, exp(−βi(T − ψi∗)− βjψi∗) + ν
(1− ν)
}
.
and ψj∗ satisfy the following equation
exp(−βiψj∗) = min
{
1, exp(−βj(T − ψj∗)− βiψj∗) + ν
1− ν
}
.
If the following two conditions are satisfied
exp(−βi(T − ψj∗)) > exp(−β
jψj∗)− 2ν
exp(−βjψj∗)− ν and
exp(−βj(T − ψi∗)) > exp(−β
iψi∗)− 2ν
exp(−βiψi∗)− ν , (16)
then the pair
(
Γ2(ψ
i∗),Γ2(ψj∗)
)
forms a Nash equilibrium.
The above ψi∗, ψj∗ < T . The conditions (16) are immediately
satisfied with βj = βi = β, in which case the common
exp(−βψ∗) = min
{
1, exp(−βT ) + ν
1− ν
}
. 
Remarks: Few interesting observations for the cases that we
derived the result: a) in two lock problem none of the agents
at an NE would try till T (in contrast to one lock problem);
b) the agents either remain silent or attempt for a time period
that is strictly less than T ; and c) we obtained NE for all the
values of the parameters for the case when βj = βi.
V. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One can easily extend the results to N -player game with
symmetric parameters, i.e., to the case when βi = β for all i.
For one lock problem it is not difficult to conjecture that the
Nash equilibrium among time-Threshold policies is given by,(
Γ(θ∗),Γ(θ∗), · · · ,Γ(θ∗)
)
with
θ∗ :=
{
− ln(ν)(N−1)β if exp(−β(N − 1)T ) ≤ ν
T else.
In a similar way the two-lock Nash equilibrium for symmetric
agents, could probably be obtained using Theorem 4; with
the parameter of the opponent as βj = (N − 1)β and
with βi = β. We conjecture the NE for this case to be,(
Γ2(ψ
i∗),Γ2(ψi∗), · · · ,Γ2(ψi∗)
)
. These are only conjec-
tures and we need to verify and prove the same. Further we
would like to work with asymmetric agents.
It would be equally interesting to work with M -lock prob-
lem with M > 2. We anticipate that the silence theorem
(like Theorems 1 and 5) should be extended and then the
analysis would follow easily. It would be more interesting to
work with the problem in which each lock fetches a reward.
For all these and more general problems, the methodology
would be the same; One needs to consider open loop control
till a new information update. Thus these partial information
problems would span from completely open loop policies
(no information) to completely closed loop policies (or full
information).
8CONCLUSIONS
We considered lock acquisition games with partial, asym-
metric information. Agents attempt to control the rate of their
Poisson clocks to acquire two locks, the first one to get both
would get the reward. There is a deadline before which the
locks are to be acquired, only the first agent to contact the lock
can acquire it and the agents are not aware of the acquisition
status of others. It is possible that an agent continues its
acquisition attempts, while the lock is already acquired by
another agent. The agents pay a cost proportional to their
rates of acquisition. We proposed a new approach to solve
these asymmetric and non-classical information games, ”open
loop control till the information update”. With this approach
we have dynamic programming equations applicable at state
change update instances and then each stage of the dynamic
programming equations is to be solved by optimal control
theory based tools (HJB equations). We showed that a pair of
(available) state dependent time threshold policies form Nash
equilibrium. We also conjectured the results for the games with
N -agents.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS RELATED TO ONE LOCK PROBLEM
Proof of Theorem 2: The best response against a threshold
policy can be obtained by solving the optimal control problem
(see equation (10) with hj as in (14))
v(x) := sup
a(·)∈C
{∫ T
0
L(t, x(t), a(t))ds− νx(T ) exp(−x(T ))
}
with state update equation given by
·
x (t) = a(t);x(0) = x and with running cost,
L(t, x, a) =

(
exp (−βjt)− νx
)
exp (−x)a for t ≤ ψ(
exp (−βjψ)− νx
)
exp (−x)a else.
Further the terminal cost is g(x) = −νx exp (−x). Thus the
HJB (PDE) equation that needs to be solved as in the proof
of Theorem 1 is given by the following:
∂
∂t
v(t, x) + sup
a∈[0,βi]
{
L(t, x, a) + a
∂v
∂x
}
= 0, (17)
v(T, x) = −νx exp (−x).
Let vt := ∂v∂t and vx :=
∂v
∂x . We conjecture that the optimal
control for this problem is a threshold policy Γ(t1) for some
appropriate 0 ≤ t1 ≤ T .
Claim:We further claim the following to be the solution of
the above PDE7, we prove this claim alongside computing t1
(we would actually show that t1 = θiν or T ):
W (t, x) =

−νx exp (−x)− ν exp (−x) + βi
βi+βj
exp (−x− βjt)
+κ1 exp(−x+ βit) if t ≤ (t1 ∧ ψ)
−(exp(−βjψ)− ν) exp(−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)
+(exp(−βjψ)− νx− ν) exp(−x) if ψ ≤ t ≤ t1
−νx exp(−x) else.
where,
κ1 =

ν exp (−βit1)− βiβi+βj exp (−(βi + βj)t1)
if ν ≥ exp(−ψβj)
ν exp (−βit1)− βiβi+βj exp (−(βi + βj)ψ)
+ exp(−βjψ)
(
exp(−βiψ)− exp(−βit1)
)
else.
The partial derivatives of the above are:
Wx(t, x) =

νx exp (−x)− βi
βi+βj
exp (−x− βjt)
−κ1 exp(−x+ βit) if t ≤ t1 ∧ ψ
+(exp(−βjψ)− ν) exp(−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)
−(exp(−βjψ)− νx) exp(−x) if ψ ≤ t ≤ t1
(νx− ν) exp(−x) else.
Wt(t, x) =

− βiβj
βi+βj
exp (−x− βjt) + βiκ1 exp(−x+ βit)
if t ≤ t1 ∧ ψ
−βi(exp(−βjψ)− ν) exp(−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)
if ψ ≤ t ≤ t1
0 else.
Now to check if the above partial derivatives verify PDE (17).
Case 1: When exp ( − βjψ) ≤ ν We will prove for this
case that t1 = θiν ≤ ψ. Thus for all t ≤ t1 ≤ ψ we have:
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
=
βj
βi + βj
exp (−x− βjt)a− κ1 exp(−x+ βit)a
=
(
βj
βi + βj
exp (−x− βj(t ∧ ψ))
+
βi
βi + βj
exp (−(βi + βj)t1) exp (−x+ βit)
−ν exp (−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)
)
a
= exp (−x)
(
βj
βi + βj
exp (−βj(t ∧ ψ)) exp(−βit)
+
βi
βi + βj
exp (−(βi + βj)t1))
−ν exp (−βit1)
)
a exp(β
i
t).
For a∗ = βi in this range we will require L(t, x, a) +
aWx(t, x) ≥ 0 and this is true if for all t ≤ t1 ∧ ψ
7We compute the following solutions, replacing the maximizers in HJB
PDEs a∗ = βi. One of them is for the case when t1 ≤ ψ and one for the
other case.
9βj
βi + βj
exp (−βjt− βit)
≥ exp (−βit1)
(
ν − β
i
βi + βj
exp (−βjt1)
)
.
Thus by monotonicity, the required inequality holds ∀ t ≤ t1,
if it holds at t = t1 and this happens if
βj
βi + βj
exp (−βjt1) ≥
(
ν − β
i
βi + βj
exp (−βjt1)
)
. (18)
For t ≥ t1 we have
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
a
=
(
exp(−βjt)− ν) exp(−x)
Thus we will have L(t, x, a)+aWx(t, x) ≤ 0 and then a∗ = 0
for all t ≥ t1, if (by monotonicity)
ν ≥ exp(−βjt1).
Thus in this case one can set t1 = θiν , i.e., such that
exp(−βjt1) = ν and this will satisfy all the required con-
ditions, like W (·, ·) satisfies the HJB PDE, the boundary
condition and also that a∗ = βi for all t ≤ t1 and a∗ = 0 for
all t ≥ t1; thus by ([3, Theorem 5.1])
BRi(Γ(ψ)) = Γ(θ
i
ν).
Case 2: When exp (− βjψ) > ν In this case a t1 > ψ
would be the required threshold, in fact we will see that t1 = T
satisfies all the required conditions.
We will begin with t ≤ ψ (with ψ ≤ t1) and for this range
of t we have:
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
=
βj
βi + βj
exp (−x− βjt)a− κ1 exp(−x+ βiψ)a
=
(
βj
βi + βj
exp (−x− βjt)
+
βi
βi + βj
exp (−(βi + βj)ψ) exp (−x+ βit)
−ν exp (−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)
− exp(−βjψ)( exp(−βiψ)− exp(−βit1)) exp(−x+ βit))a
= exp (−x)
(
βj
βi + βj
exp (−βjt) exp(−βit)
+
βi
βi + βj
exp (−(βi + βj)ψ))
−ν exp (−βit1)
− exp(−βjψ)( exp(−βiψ)− exp(−βit1)))a exp(βit).
For obtaining a∗ = βi in this range we will require
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x) ≥ 0 and this is true for all t ≤ ψ
if the following is positive:,
βj
βi + βj
exp (−βjt) exp(−βit) ≥ − β
i
βi + βj
exp (−(βi + βj)ψ))
+ν exp (−βit1)
+ exp(−βjψ)( exp(−βiψ)− exp(−βit1))
Thus by monotonicity, the required inequality holds ∀ t ≤
ψ, if it holds at ψ and this happens if
exp (−βjψ − βiψ)
≥
(
ν exp (−βit1) + exp(−βjψ)
(
exp(−βiψ)− exp(−βit1)
))
.
Or equivalently we require
0 ≥
(
ν − exp(−βjψ)
)
exp(−βit1).
With exp(−βjψ) > ν, the above is immediate.
Now lets consider ψ ≤ t ≤ t1 and as we already mentioned
we would like to show that t1 = T satisfies the required
conditions (L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ ψ also).
In this range of t:
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
= (exp(−βjψ)− ν) exp(−βit1) exp(−x+ βit)a.
Now it is clear that the above is greater than 0 for all t ≥ ψ as
for this case exp(−βjψ) > ν and thus one can set t1 = T .
Thus in all, one can verify that the following values of t1
satisfy all the required conditions ([3, Theorem 5.1]) and we
will have the best response as Γ(t1) with:
t1 =
{
θiν if exp(−βjψ) ≤ ν
T else. 
APPENDIX B: TWO LOCK PROOFS
Theorem 5. [Best response against Silence with two locks]
If the other player is silent and if the player i, has to choose an
optimal policy that gets reward c, only after contacting both
the locks and if this trial is for time U , then the corresponding
optimal control problem is given by:
sup
a(·)∈C
{∫ U
0
(c− ν)
(
1− exp(−βi(U − s))
)
exp(−x(s))a(s)ds
− ν
(∫ U
0
x(s) exp(−x(s))a(s)ds+ x(U) exp(−x(U))
)}
with
·
x (t) = a(t) and x(0) = x.
ii) The solution of the above problem is the following:
a∗(t) = Γ(θiν2) with (19)
θiν2 := max
{
0, U +
1
βi
log
(
c− 2ν
c− ν
)}
1c>2ν
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and the value function is given by:
v(x) =

(c− 2ν) exp(−x) (1− exp(−βiθν2))
− (νx+ (c− ν)βiθν2 exp(−βiU)) exp(−x)
if θiν2 > 0
−νx exp(−x) if θiν2 = 0.
(20)
Proof: Let us assume that agent i succeeds at τ i1 ≈ u,
i.e., say z2 = (s, u). It will then try to acquire the second
lock. In this case the optimal control problem would be (with
x(u) := a¯i(u), a(u) = ai2(i) and Γ := U − u and T := U )
J(a(.)) =
∫ Γ
0
c exp(−x(u))a(u)du
−ν
(∫ Γ
0
x(u) exp(−x(u))a(u)du+ x(Γ) exp(−x(Γ))
)
.
This is exactly as in Theorem 1 corresponding to M = 1 case
and hence a∗ ≡ 0 (if c < ν) or a∗ ≡ βi (if c ≥ ν) depending
upon the value of ν. Note the optimal control does not depend
upon u or z2. However the value function depends upon u and
hence z2.
If ν > c, because of the above result, it is easy to observe
that a∗ = Γ2(0), i.e., ai∗1 = 0 as well as a
i∗
2 (z2) ≡ 0, i.e., for
all 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Now we consider the case with ν ≤ c.
Further the value function at z2, by applying Theorem 1
with x = 0 (note that x(t) represents the fictitious state for
the optimal control problem solving the second stage of the
dynamic programming equation and hence starts with x(0) =
0) is given by:
vi2(z2; Γ2(0)) = (c− ν)
(
1− exp(−βi(T − u))) .
By hypothesis the reward upon success is c. Thus from DP
equations (15), the optimal control for the start (ai∗1 (·)) is
obtained by optimizing the following objective function:
J(a(.)) =
∫ T
0
(c− ν)
(
1− exp(−βi(T − u))
)
exp(−x(u))a(u)du
−ν
(∫ T
0
x(u) exp(−x(u))a(u)du+ x(T ) exp(−x(T ))
)
,
over all a(·) ∈ C. This is again an optimal control problem.
We drop the superscript i in this proof, for simpler notations.
Thus we need the solution of the following (Hamiltonian
Jacobi) HJB PDE, with v(t, x) representing the value function
and with vt, vx its partial derivatives
max
a∈[0,β]
{[
((c− ν)− νx) exp (−x)− (c− ν) exp (−x+ β(t− T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(x,t,a)/a
]
a
+avx(t, x)
}
+ vt(t, x) = 0
with boundary condition v(T, x) = −νx exp(−x).
Claim: We claim the following is a solution satisfying the
above boundary value problem, prove that the optimal control
is a threshold policy Γ(t1) and further compute t1:
W (t, x) =

(c− ν)βt exp(−x+ βt− βT )
+(c− 2ν − νx) exp(−x) + κ exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
−νx exp(−x) if t > t1,
with
κ = −(c− ν)βt1 exp(−βT )− (c− 2ν) exp(−βt1).
Note that its partial derivatives are:
Wt(t, x) =

(c− ν)β(tβ + 1) exp(−x+ βt− βT )
+βκ exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
0 if t > t1,
Wx(t, x) =

−(c− ν)βt exp(−x+ βt− βT )
−(c− ν − νx) exp(−x)− κ exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
(νx− ν) exp(−x) if t > t1.
For t ≤ t1 we have for any a
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
a
= −(c− ν)(βt+ 1) exp(−x+ βt− βT )− κ exp(−x+ βt)
= −(c− ν)(βt+ 1− βt1) exp(−x+ βt− βT )
+(c− 2ν) exp(−x+ βt− βt1)
= exp(−x+ βt− βt1)(
(c− ν)(β(t1 − t)− 1) exp(−β(T − t1)) + (c− 2ν)
)
. (21)
Thus if c > 2ν and if we set t1 as below
exp(−β(T − t1)) = (c− 2ν)
(c− ν) or if t1 := T +
1
β
log
(
c− 2ν
c− ν
)
,
then8 L(t, x, a) +aWx(t, x) > 0 for all t ≤ t1. Further for all
t > t1, for the same choice of t1
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
a
= (c− 2ν) exp (−x)− (c− ν) exp (−x+ β(t− T ))
< exp(−x)
(
(c− 2ν)− (c− ν) exp(β(t1 − T ))
)
= 0.
Thus W (., .) satisfies the HJB PDE for all t ≤ T with a∗(t) =
Γ(t1) = β
i1t≤t1 ,
Wt(t, x) + L(t, x, a
∗(t)) + a∗(t)Wx(t, x) = 0
and also satisfies the boundary condition
W (T, x) + κ exp(−x+ βT ) = −νx exp(−x) for any x.
Thus the so defined a∗(t) and x∗(t) = βi min{t, t1} satisfy
equation (5.7) of [3, Theorem 5.1], when ν ≤ c/2 and hence
8The required term is positive for all t ≤ t1 if and only if the second term
(21) is positive for all such t, this term is decreasing in t and hence would
be positive for all such t, if it is positive/non-negative at t = t1
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forms the optimal control.
When ν > c/2, using similar logic one can show that
W (t, x) = −νx exp(−x) (for all t) is the solution of the HJB
PDE and a∗(t) = 0 for all t. Rest of the things follow from
the solutions, W (·, ·). 
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Proof of Theorem 4: We compute the best response against threshold policies of type Γ2(ψj) for those ψj which can
potentially become a part of the Nash Equilibrium. To begin with we obtain the best response against silent opponent in Theorem
5. Theorem 5 is used to solve the HJB equations (that represent the best response against Γ2(ψj)) with c = exp(−βjψj) and
for all t ≥ ψj . By Dynamic programming principle (as applied to optimal control problem), one can use the results (the value
function) of Theorem 5 as the boundary condition (i.e., as v(ψj , x)) to solve the problem for t ≤ ψj .
Thus for t ≤ ψj we need to solve the following HJB PDE (for all t ≤ ψj)
vt + max
a∈[0,β]
{
(1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−x)− (1− ν) exp(−βiT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βit) exp(−x)
−νx exp(−x) + vx
}
a = 0
with boundary condition as given by Theorem 5 (with c := exp(−βjψj), Γ := T − ψj):
v(ψj , x) =

(c− 2ν) exp(−x)(1− exp(−βiΓ))
− (νx+ (c− ν)βiθν2 exp(−βiΓ)) exp(−x) if θν2 > 0
−νx exp(−x) else,
θν2(ψ
j) := max
{
0,Γ +
1
βi
log
(
c− 2ν
c− ν
)}
1c>2ν
We would proceed only with those ψj for which θν2(ψ
j) = 0. That is, we have
exp(−β(T − ψj)) ≥ c− 2ν
c− ν . (22)
Note that c < 2ν condition is also captured by the above. In either case, the terminal condition is −νx exp(−x). We drop
subscript i for simpler notations and conjecture the following to be the solution (for the best response against Γ2(ψj) and with
t ≤ ψj) and obtain appropriate t1:
W (t, x) =

−(1− ν) ββj exp(−βT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βt) exp(−x)− (νx+ ν) exp(−x)
+ ββ+βj (1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−x) + κ1 exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
−νx exp(−x) else.
with
κ1 = − β
β + βj
(1− ν) exp(−βjt1) exp(−βt1)
+(1− ν) β
βj
exp(−βjt1) exp(−βT ) + ν exp(−βt1).
The partial derivatives are:
Wt(t, x) =

−(1− ν)β(β−βj)βj exp(−βT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βt) exp(−x)
− ββjβ+βj (1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−x) + βκ1 exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
0 else.
Wx(t, x) =

(1− ν) ββj exp(−βT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βt) exp(−x)
+νx exp(−x)− ββ+βj (1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−x)− κ1 exp(−x+ βt) if t ≤ t1
(νx− ν) exp(−x) else.
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Thus for any t ≤ t1 we have
L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x)
a
= (1− ν)β − β
j
βj
exp(−βT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βt) exp(−x)
+
βj
β + βj
(1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−x)− κ1 exp(−x+ βt)
= (1− ν)
(
β − βj
βj
exp(−βjt) exp(−βT )
+
βj
β + βj
exp(−βjt) exp(−βt) + β
β + βj
exp(−βjt1) exp(−βt1)
− β
βj
exp(−βjt1) exp(−βT )− ν
1− ν exp(−βt1)
)
exp(−x+ βt)
We need to choose a t1 > 0 such that the following is positive for all t ≤ t1
−ν exp(−βt1)− (1− ν) exp(−βjt) exp(−βT ) (23)
+(1− ν) β
j
β + βj
exp(−βjt) exp(−βt)
+(1− ν) β
β + βj
exp(−βjt1) exp(−βt1) ≥ 0,
and such that for all t ≥ t1 (by computing L(t, x, a) + aWx(t, x) with t ≥ t1)
(1− ν) exp(−βjt)− (1− ν) exp(−βiT ) exp(−βjt) exp(βit)− ν ≤ 0. (24)
The RHS of (23) is decreasing in t (the derivative of RHS9 of (23) is negative) and thus we will effectively require that
(23) is satisfied at an appropriate t1, i.e., we will require a t1 such that
−ν − (1− ν) exp(−βjt1) exp(−βT ) exp(βt1) + (1− ν) exp(−βjt1) ≥ 0 (25)
The RHS of second equation (24) is also decreasing (the derivative10 is again negative) in t, so once again it suffices to
check (24) at t = t1. So, we would have an interior t1 = ψi∗ , if t1 exactly solves the following:
(1− ν) exp(−βjt1) = (1− ν) exp(−βiT ) exp(−βjt1) exp(βit1) + ν. (26)
The RHS of (25) with t1 = T equals −ν which is never positive, thus t1 < T .
In summary either ψi∗ = t1 > 0 exactly satisfies (26) or it would be ψi∗ = 0 if 1− exp(−βiT ) ≤ ν1−ν ,
from (24), i.e., the best response would be to be silent throughout. Thus the thresholds given in the hypothesis of the theorem
for (ψi∗, ψj∗) are the correct thresholds.
Thus if there exists a ψj such that θν2(ψ
j) = 0, the best response of agent i is given by Γ2(ψi∗) where ψi∗ satisfies (26)
or is 0. Note that this best response is the same for all ψj such that θν2(ψ
j) = 0. To find a potential NE, we will need best
response of agent j against Γ2(ψi∗). But one can apply the analysis obtained so far with roles of agent j and agent i reversed.
Thus if t1 := ψi∗ satisfies (22) (with βi and βj interchanged) then a t2 = ψj∗ that satisfies the following (see (26))
(1− ν) exp(−βit2) = (1− ν) exp(−βjT ) exp(−βit2) exp(βjt2) + ν,
(or ψj∗ = 0) is the best response against Γ2(ψi∗). We are done if we show that such a ψj∗ satisfies (22). But this is ensured
by (16) of hypothesis.
9the derivative equals (1− ν) exp(−βjt)βj
(
exp(−βiT )− exp(−βit)
)
< 0
10derivative = (1− ν) exp(−βjt) (−βj + (βj − βi) exp(−βi(T − t))) = (1− ν) exp(−βjt)(−βj(1−exp(−βi(T−t)))−βi exp(−βi(T−t))) <
0
14
We are left to work with boundary conditions, which are considered below case by case.
Case 1: When exp (− βjT ) < (1− 2ν)/(1− ν) and exp (− βiT ) ≥ (1− 2ν)/(1− ν) In this case we claim that
ψi∗ = 0 and ψj∗ = θjν2 . From Silence Theorem 5, the best response
BRj(Γ2(0)) = Γ2(θ
j
ν2).
Remains to show the other best response is 0, i.e., to one should find BRi(Γ2(θjν2)). With ψ
j = θjν2 , the RHS of equation
(22) equals
exp(−βi(T − ψj)) ≥ exp(−βiT ) ≥ 1− 2ν
1− ν ,
thus condition (22) is satisfied (in fact this condition would be satisfied for any ψj). Again for the given case, (24) is satisfied
for all t ≥ t1 with t1 = 0 and thus we have
BRi(Γ2(θ
j
ν2)) = Γ2(0).
Further from Silence Theorem 5 we have
exp(−βjψj∗) = exp(−βjT )1− 2ν
1− ν ,
and we also have ψj∗ > 0 ( as exp(−βjψj∗) ≤ [(1− 2ν)/(1− ν)]2 < 1 ).
Case 2: When exp (− βjT ) ≥ (1− 2ν)/(1− ν) and exp (− βiT ) ≥ (1− 2ν)/(1− ν) Using exactly similar
logic as in Case 1, one can show that ψi∗ = 0 = ψj∗. 
